Listens: Deep Purple-"Smoke on the Water"

Investigating the President: LBJ and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution

The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (also known as the Southeast Asia Resolution)was a joint resolution that the United States Congress passed on August 7, 1964. It was a response to what was known as the the "Gulf of Tonkin incident" in which it was alleged that North Vietnamese ships had fired on an American Ship, the USS Maddox. It was of historical significance because it gave President Lyndon B. Johnson authorization, without a formal declaration of war by Congress, to use conventional military force in Southeast Asia. The resolution authorized the President to do whatever necessary in order to assist "any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty". This included involving armed forces. The Johnson administration subsequently relied upon the resolution to begin its rapid escalation of U.S. military involvement in South Vietnam and open warfare between North Vietnam and the United States. It was later alleged that the resolution was obtained under false pretenses.

lyndon-b-johnson-greetstroops

The USS Maddox, a U.S. destroyer, was conducting a patrol in the waters of the Gulf of Tonkin on August 2, 1964. It reported being attacked by three North Vietnamese Navy torpedo boats from the 135th Torpedo Squadron. The Maddox fired over 280 5-inch shells and the North Vietnamese boats fired their six torpedoes followed by machine-gun fire. The combatants then commenced going their separate ways, when the three torpedo boats were then attacked by four USN F-8 Crusader jet fighter bombers from the aircraft carrier USS Ticonderoga. The Crusaders scored hits on all three torpedo boats with their 20-mm cannons, damaging all three boats.

Two days later on August 4, the Maddox and the destroyer Turner Joy both reported to be under attack again, by North Vietnamese torpedo boats. Hanoi subsequently insisted that it had not launched a second attack. Subsequent investigation has cast doubt on whether there was in fact any second attack. Nevertheless, President Johnson ordered the launching of retaliatory air strikes (Operation Pierce Arrow) on the bases of the North Vietnamese torpedo boats.

Johnson announced, in a television address to the American public that evening, that U.S. naval forces had been attacked by the North Vietnamese. Johnson requested approval of a resolution "expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in southeast Asia". He asked for a resolution that expressed support "for all necessary action to protect our Armed Forces". He told his audience that "the United States will seeks no wider war". It was an election year and Johnson was running to win the presidency in his own right. (He had become president following the assassination of John F. Kennedy). Johnson was accused of being weak in the fight against communist aggression by his opponent, Republican Senator Barry Goldwater. In his speech, Johnson said that the resolution would send a message to hostile nations that the United States was determined "to continue to protect its national interests".

On August 6, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara testified before a joint session of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees. He stated that the Maddox had been "carrying out a routine mission of the type we carry out all over the world at all times". McNamara denied that it had been in any way involved in South Vietnamese patrol boat raids on the offshore islands of Hon Me and Hon Nieu on the nights of July 30 and July 31. He misled the Senate. Although the island raids were separate from the mission of the Maddox, the ship had been a part of a program of clandestine attacks on North Vietnamese installations called Operation Plan 34A. These operations were carried out by U.S.-trained South Vietnamese commandos under the control of a special operations unit of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam called the Studies and Operations Group.

After fewer than nine hours of committee deliberation and floor debate, Congress voted, on August 10, 1964, on a joint resolution authorizing the president "to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom". The unanimous affirmative vote in the House of Representatives was 416–0. The Senate conferred its approval by a vote of 88–2. Democratic Senators Wayne Morse of Oregon and Ernest Gruening of Alaska cast the only nay votes. Senator Morse predicted "I believe this resolution to be a historic mistake."

An later investigation by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee revealed that the Maddox had been on an electronic intelligence collection mission off the North Vietnamese coast. It also learned that the U.S. Naval Communication Center in the Philippine Islands, in reviewing ships' messages, had questioned whether any second attack had actually occurred. In 2005, an internal National Security Agency historical study was declassified. That report concluded that the Maddox had engaged the North Vietnamese Navy on August 2, but that there may not even have been any North Vietnamese Naval vessels present during the engagement of August 4. The report stated: "It is not simply that there is a different story as to what happened; it is that no attack happened that night."

no title

Although the Senate Foreign Relations Committee discovered that Johnson may have gone to war under false pretenses, it never called the President to account. The administration of President Richard Nixon, which took office in January 1969, opposed repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
Mounting public opinion against the war eventually led to the repeal of the resolution, which was attached to the Foreign Military Sales Act that Nixon signed in January 1971. Congress passed the War Powers Resolution in 1973, over Nixon's veto. The War Powers Resolution, which is still in effect, sets forth certain requirements for the President to consult with Congress in regard to decisions that engage U.S. forces in hostilities or imminent hostilities.