1968: Lyndon Johnson and The Vietnam War Up To 1968
Everything that happened in the United States in 1968 was set against the backdrop of the Vietnam War. Lyndon Johnson had been President of the United States for over four years as the year opened, and domestically, he was building what he called "the Great Society". All too quickly however, his presidency became consumed by what he termed "that bitch of a war."
When Lyndon B. Johnson took over the presidency in November of 1963 after the assassination of John F. Kennedy, he had not been heavily involved with policy toward Vietnam. Upon becoming president, all that changed. Johnson knew that he had inherited a rapidly deteriorating situation in South Vietnam. Like many others of his generation, he bought into the Domino Theory, believing that if the United States failed to protect South Vietnam, communism would soon spread throughout southeast Asia.
On August 2, 1964, when the USS Maddox was on an intelligence mission along North Vietnam's coast, it was allegedly fired upon and damaged several torpedo boats that had been stalking it in the Gulf of Tonkin. A second attack was reported two days later on the USS Turner Joy and Maddox in the same area. The circumstances of the attacks were unclear. An undated NSA publication declassified in 2005 revealed that there was no attack on August 4th. The second "attack" prompted Congress to approve the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on August 7, 1964. It granted the president unilateral power to launch any military actions he deemed necessary. At the time Johnson pledged that he was not "committing American boys to fighting a war that I think ought to be fought by the boys of Asia to help protect their own land".
The National Security Council recommended a three-stage escalation of the bombing of North Vietnam. On February 7, 1965 following an attack on a U.S. Army base in Pleiku, Operation Flaming Dart, Operation Rolling Thunder and Operation Arc Light commenced. The bombing campaign was intended to force North Vietnam to cease its support for the Viet Cong by threatening to destroy North Vietnam's air defenses and industrial infrastructure. Between March 1965 and November 1968, "Rolling Thunder" deluged the north with a million tons of missiles, rockets and bombs. Massive aerial bombardment against the People's Army of Vietnam forces were carried out by the US to prevent the collapse of the Royal central government, and to deny the use of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Between 1964 and 1973, the U.S. dropped two million tons of bombs on Laos, almost as many bombs as the U.S. dropped in Europe and Asia during all of World War II. The Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force Curtis LeMay famously said, "we're going to bomb them back into the Stone Age".
It was decided that U.S. Air Force bases needed more protection as the South Vietnamese military seemed incapable of providing security. On March 8, 1965, 3,500 U.S. Marines were dispatched to South Vietnam. This marked the beginning of the American ground war. At the time U.S. public opinion overwhelmingly supported the deployment. North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh warned Johnson that if the Americans "want to make war for twenty years then we shall make war for twenty years. If they want to make peace, we shall make peace and invite them to afternoon tea."
The first deployment of 3,500 in March 1965 was increased to nearly 200,000 by December of that year. General William Westmoreland had a three-point plan to win the war:
Phase 1. Commitment of U.S. (and other free world) forces necessary to halt the losing trend by the end of 1965.
Phase 2. U.S. and allied forces mount major offensive actions to seize the initiative to destroy guerrilla and organized enemy forces. This phase would end when the enemy had been worn down, thrown on the defensive, and driven back from major populated areas.
Phase 3. If the enemy persisted, a period of twelve to eighteen months following Phase 2 would be required for the final destruction of enemy forces remaining in remote base areas.
The plan was approved by Johnson. It marked a profound departure from the Kennedy administration's insistence that the government of South Vietnam was responsible for defeating the guerrillas. Westmoreland predicted victory by the end of 1967.
The American buildup transformed the economy of South Vietnam and had a profound effect on South Vietnamese society. A huge surge in corruption followed. Washington encouraged its SEATO allies to contribute troops. Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines all agreed to send troops. Other NATO nations, including Canada and the United Kingdom, declined Washington's troop requests.
The political situation in South Vietnam began to stabilize when Prime minister Air Marshal Nguyễn Cao Kỳ and figurehead Chief of State, General Nguyễn Văn Thiệu came to power in mid-1965 at the head of a military junta. In 1967, Thieu became president with Ky as his deputy, as the result of fraudulent elections. The Johnson administration employed what was called a "policy of minimum candor" in its dealings with the media. Military information officers sought to manage media coverage by emphasizing stories that portrayed progress in the war. This strategy would backfire as reporters on the scene in Vietnam would soon discover that the official reports did not match reality.
In early 1966, Robert Kennedy, who had been Attorney-General, and was now a Senator from New York, harshly criticized Johnson's bombing campaign. He said that the U.S. was "on a road from which there is no turning back, a road that leads to catastrophe for all mankind." The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Senator James William Fulbright, held televised hearings examining the administration's Vietnam policy. In June, Johnson's old friend Senator Richard Russell, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, declared it was time to "get it over or get out."
By the fall of 1966, Johnson was urged to begin peace discussions. But before they would agree to this, the North Vietnamese insisted on a unilateral end to US bombing and withdrawal of its forces. Johnson grew more and more anxious about justifying war casualties, and talked of the need for decisive victory, despite the unpopularity of the cause. By year's end Johnson agreed to Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's new recommendation to add 70,000 troops in 1967 to the 400,000 previously committed. Johnson also accepted the CIA's recommendation to increase the level of bombing. The bombing ended secret peace talks, though no one considered North Vietnamese intentions to be genuine.
In March 1967, Robert Kennedy expressed his opposition to the war in a Senate speech. Johnson pressed on, relying on some optimistic reports, of questionable reliability.The CIA was reporting wide food shortages in Hanoi and an unstable power grid, as well as military manpower reductions. By the middle of 1967 nearly 70,000 Americans had been killed or wounded in the war, which was being commonly described in the news media as a "stalemate." In July, Johnson sent McNamara, Wheeler and other officials to meet with Westmoreland in order to reach agreement on plans for the future. Westmoreland requested an additional 80,500 to 200,000 reinforcements on top of the 470,000 soldiers already scheduled to be sent to Vietnam. Johnson agreed to an increase of 55,000 troops bringing the total to 525,000. In August, Johnson, with the Joint Chiefs' support, decided to expand the air campaign and exempted only Hanoi, Haiphong and a buffer zone with China from the target list. Later that month McNamara told a Senate subcommittee that an expanded air campaign would not bring Hanoi to the peace table.
In response to McNamara's statement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff threatened mass resignation. McNamara was summoned to the White House for a three-hour dressing down. But Johnson knew that McNamara's analysis was likely correct. Johnson convened a group of veteran government foreign policy experts, informally known as "the Wise Men" to reconsider the direction of the war. This group was composed of Dean Acheson, Gen. Omar Bradley, George Ball, Mac Bundy, Arthur Dean, Douglas Dillon, Abe Fortas, Averell Harriman, Henry Cabot Lodge, Robert Murphy and Max Taylor. They unanimously opposed leaving Vietnam, and encouraged Johnson to "stay the course." On November 17, in a nationally televised address, Johnson assured the American public, "We are inflicting greater losses than we're taking. We are making progress." Less than two weeks later, Robert McNamara announced his resignation as Defense Secretary. Privately, he had begun regularly expressing doubts over Johnson's war strategy, angering the President. He was one of a growing list of Johnson's top aides who resigned over the war, including Bill Moyers, McGeorge Bundy and George Ball.
Then came the Tet Offensive.
When Lyndon B. Johnson took over the presidency in November of 1963 after the assassination of John F. Kennedy, he had not been heavily involved with policy toward Vietnam. Upon becoming president, all that changed. Johnson knew that he had inherited a rapidly deteriorating situation in South Vietnam. Like many others of his generation, he bought into the Domino Theory, believing that if the United States failed to protect South Vietnam, communism would soon spread throughout southeast Asia.
On August 2, 1964, when the USS Maddox was on an intelligence mission along North Vietnam's coast, it was allegedly fired upon and damaged several torpedo boats that had been stalking it in the Gulf of Tonkin. A second attack was reported two days later on the USS Turner Joy and Maddox in the same area. The circumstances of the attacks were unclear. An undated NSA publication declassified in 2005 revealed that there was no attack on August 4th. The second "attack" prompted Congress to approve the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on August 7, 1964. It granted the president unilateral power to launch any military actions he deemed necessary. At the time Johnson pledged that he was not "committing American boys to fighting a war that I think ought to be fought by the boys of Asia to help protect their own land".
The National Security Council recommended a three-stage escalation of the bombing of North Vietnam. On February 7, 1965 following an attack on a U.S. Army base in Pleiku, Operation Flaming Dart, Operation Rolling Thunder and Operation Arc Light commenced. The bombing campaign was intended to force North Vietnam to cease its support for the Viet Cong by threatening to destroy North Vietnam's air defenses and industrial infrastructure. Between March 1965 and November 1968, "Rolling Thunder" deluged the north with a million tons of missiles, rockets and bombs. Massive aerial bombardment against the People's Army of Vietnam forces were carried out by the US to prevent the collapse of the Royal central government, and to deny the use of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Between 1964 and 1973, the U.S. dropped two million tons of bombs on Laos, almost as many bombs as the U.S. dropped in Europe and Asia during all of World War II. The Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force Curtis LeMay famously said, "we're going to bomb them back into the Stone Age".
It was decided that U.S. Air Force bases needed more protection as the South Vietnamese military seemed incapable of providing security. On March 8, 1965, 3,500 U.S. Marines were dispatched to South Vietnam. This marked the beginning of the American ground war. At the time U.S. public opinion overwhelmingly supported the deployment. North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh warned Johnson that if the Americans "want to make war for twenty years then we shall make war for twenty years. If they want to make peace, we shall make peace and invite them to afternoon tea."
The first deployment of 3,500 in March 1965 was increased to nearly 200,000 by December of that year. General William Westmoreland had a three-point plan to win the war:
Phase 1. Commitment of U.S. (and other free world) forces necessary to halt the losing trend by the end of 1965.
Phase 2. U.S. and allied forces mount major offensive actions to seize the initiative to destroy guerrilla and organized enemy forces. This phase would end when the enemy had been worn down, thrown on the defensive, and driven back from major populated areas.
Phase 3. If the enemy persisted, a period of twelve to eighteen months following Phase 2 would be required for the final destruction of enemy forces remaining in remote base areas.
The plan was approved by Johnson. It marked a profound departure from the Kennedy administration's insistence that the government of South Vietnam was responsible for defeating the guerrillas. Westmoreland predicted victory by the end of 1967.
The American buildup transformed the economy of South Vietnam and had a profound effect on South Vietnamese society. A huge surge in corruption followed. Washington encouraged its SEATO allies to contribute troops. Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines all agreed to send troops. Other NATO nations, including Canada and the United Kingdom, declined Washington's troop requests.
The political situation in South Vietnam began to stabilize when Prime minister Air Marshal Nguyễn Cao Kỳ and figurehead Chief of State, General Nguyễn Văn Thiệu came to power in mid-1965 at the head of a military junta. In 1967, Thieu became president with Ky as his deputy, as the result of fraudulent elections. The Johnson administration employed what was called a "policy of minimum candor" in its dealings with the media. Military information officers sought to manage media coverage by emphasizing stories that portrayed progress in the war. This strategy would backfire as reporters on the scene in Vietnam would soon discover that the official reports did not match reality.
In early 1966, Robert Kennedy, who had been Attorney-General, and was now a Senator from New York, harshly criticized Johnson's bombing campaign. He said that the U.S. was "on a road from which there is no turning back, a road that leads to catastrophe for all mankind." The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Senator James William Fulbright, held televised hearings examining the administration's Vietnam policy. In June, Johnson's old friend Senator Richard Russell, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, declared it was time to "get it over or get out."
By the fall of 1966, Johnson was urged to begin peace discussions. But before they would agree to this, the North Vietnamese insisted on a unilateral end to US bombing and withdrawal of its forces. Johnson grew more and more anxious about justifying war casualties, and talked of the need for decisive victory, despite the unpopularity of the cause. By year's end Johnson agreed to Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's new recommendation to add 70,000 troops in 1967 to the 400,000 previously committed. Johnson also accepted the CIA's recommendation to increase the level of bombing. The bombing ended secret peace talks, though no one considered North Vietnamese intentions to be genuine.
In March 1967, Robert Kennedy expressed his opposition to the war in a Senate speech. Johnson pressed on, relying on some optimistic reports, of questionable reliability.The CIA was reporting wide food shortages in Hanoi and an unstable power grid, as well as military manpower reductions. By the middle of 1967 nearly 70,000 Americans had been killed or wounded in the war, which was being commonly described in the news media as a "stalemate." In July, Johnson sent McNamara, Wheeler and other officials to meet with Westmoreland in order to reach agreement on plans for the future. Westmoreland requested an additional 80,500 to 200,000 reinforcements on top of the 470,000 soldiers already scheduled to be sent to Vietnam. Johnson agreed to an increase of 55,000 troops bringing the total to 525,000. In August, Johnson, with the Joint Chiefs' support, decided to expand the air campaign and exempted only Hanoi, Haiphong and a buffer zone with China from the target list. Later that month McNamara told a Senate subcommittee that an expanded air campaign would not bring Hanoi to the peace table.
In response to McNamara's statement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff threatened mass resignation. McNamara was summoned to the White House for a three-hour dressing down. But Johnson knew that McNamara's analysis was likely correct. Johnson convened a group of veteran government foreign policy experts, informally known as "the Wise Men" to reconsider the direction of the war. This group was composed of Dean Acheson, Gen. Omar Bradley, George Ball, Mac Bundy, Arthur Dean, Douglas Dillon, Abe Fortas, Averell Harriman, Henry Cabot Lodge, Robert Murphy and Max Taylor. They unanimously opposed leaving Vietnam, and encouraged Johnson to "stay the course." On November 17, in a nationally televised address, Johnson assured the American public, "We are inflicting greater losses than we're taking. We are making progress." Less than two weeks later, Robert McNamara announced his resignation as Defense Secretary. Privately, he had begun regularly expressing doubts over Johnson's war strategy, angering the President. He was one of a growing list of Johnson's top aides who resigned over the war, including Bill Moyers, McGeorge Bundy and George Ball.
Then came the Tet Offensive.