Potus Geeks Book Review: Ike and McCarthy by David Nichols
On October 3, 1952 General Dwight Eisenhower was campaigning for President in Madison, Wisconsin, in a state whose junior United States Senator had recently disparaged Eisenhower's mentor, the iconic General George C. Marshall, by accusing Marshall of treason and of collaborating with communists. These slanderous accusation incensed Eisenhower tremendously, and when Eisenhower found himself campaigning in McCarthy's home state that fall, he had planned on calling out McCarthy for his offensive comments and on defending the revered Marshall. But he decided not to do so. Political expediency trumped principle that day, and Eisenhower removed the offending portion from his speech, posing with McCarthy for a picture as the two men shook hands. It was a decision that Eisenhower almost immediately came to regret.
Disappointment over Eisenhower's failed effort to call out the offensive Wisconsin Republican Senator led many to perceive Eisenhower as weak and cowering when it came to confronting McCarthy and his distasteful bullying tactics. This was a perception that author David Nichols contends, in his 2017 book Ike and McCarthy: Dwight Eisenhower's Secret Campaign Against Joseph McCarthy is wholly inaccurate. This book is dedicated to making the case that, while Eisenhower never directly criticized McCarthy by name, he waged a brilliant and masterfully strategic behind-the-scenes campaign to discredit McCarthy and to neuter him politically. Nichols tells the story of the McCarthy led investigation into allegations of communist infiltration of the United States Army and how Eisenhower covertly orchestrated political efforts to bring about McCarthy's downfall and to protect the integrity of the army officers that McCarthy sought to disgrace. It is the story of McCarthy's alleged misuse of power by his own actions and those of his inner circle including unscrupulous attorney Roy Cohn. Cohn was alleged to have misused his influence to obtain special treatment for his close friend (and possibly his lover) G. David Schine after Schine was drafted into the army, by threatening to turn up the heat in the McCarthy committee's investigation of communism in the army unless Schine was granted special privileges. Nichols tells the story of how Cohn's efforts were publicly exposed, leading to the discrediting of McCarthy and of his methods.
Nichols describes all of the key players in this 1950s political drama that garnered national attention as the hearings were televised and unfolded in the media spotlight. These included key members of Eisenhower's White House staff (such as his Chief of Staff Sherman Adams and his press secretary Jim Hagerty), Army Secretary Robert Stevens, lawyers John Adams, Struve Hensel and Joseph Welch, Eisenhower's special advisors Fred Seaton and Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., and Senators Karl Mundt, Everett Dirksen and Ralph Flanders. Nichols describes how Eisenhower directed these men, much like pieces on a chess board, as part of an intricate political strategy, all the while appearing to be removed from the conflict. According to Nichols, Eisenhower would never mention McCarthy by name, as if doing so would somehow give his adversary political oxygen. Nichols demonstrates how Eisenhower was also a master of media strategy, deftly handling reporters at press conferences and by targeted and perfectly timed release of information.
David Nichols provides a well researched account both of what went on in the public eye and behind the scenes. He offers a rare window on oval office political strategic machination as well as a fresh perspective on the McCarthy hearings. It is always a pleasure for a reader of history when the historian can provide an account of an event that goes beyond what is common knowledge, while maintaining fidelity to credible historic records. David Nichols succeeds very capably in this pursuit.
Disappointment over Eisenhower's failed effort to call out the offensive Wisconsin Republican Senator led many to perceive Eisenhower as weak and cowering when it came to confronting McCarthy and his distasteful bullying tactics. This was a perception that author David Nichols contends, in his 2017 book Ike and McCarthy: Dwight Eisenhower's Secret Campaign Against Joseph McCarthy is wholly inaccurate. This book is dedicated to making the case that, while Eisenhower never directly criticized McCarthy by name, he waged a brilliant and masterfully strategic behind-the-scenes campaign to discredit McCarthy and to neuter him politically. Nichols tells the story of the McCarthy led investigation into allegations of communist infiltration of the United States Army and how Eisenhower covertly orchestrated political efforts to bring about McCarthy's downfall and to protect the integrity of the army officers that McCarthy sought to disgrace. It is the story of McCarthy's alleged misuse of power by his own actions and those of his inner circle including unscrupulous attorney Roy Cohn. Cohn was alleged to have misused his influence to obtain special treatment for his close friend (and possibly his lover) G. David Schine after Schine was drafted into the army, by threatening to turn up the heat in the McCarthy committee's investigation of communism in the army unless Schine was granted special privileges. Nichols tells the story of how Cohn's efforts were publicly exposed, leading to the discrediting of McCarthy and of his methods.
Nichols describes all of the key players in this 1950s political drama that garnered national attention as the hearings were televised and unfolded in the media spotlight. These included key members of Eisenhower's White House staff (such as his Chief of Staff Sherman Adams and his press secretary Jim Hagerty), Army Secretary Robert Stevens, lawyers John Adams, Struve Hensel and Joseph Welch, Eisenhower's special advisors Fred Seaton and Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., and Senators Karl Mundt, Everett Dirksen and Ralph Flanders. Nichols describes how Eisenhower directed these men, much like pieces on a chess board, as part of an intricate political strategy, all the while appearing to be removed from the conflict. According to Nichols, Eisenhower would never mention McCarthy by name, as if doing so would somehow give his adversary political oxygen. Nichols demonstrates how Eisenhower was also a master of media strategy, deftly handling reporters at press conferences and by targeted and perfectly timed release of information.
David Nichols provides a well researched account both of what went on in the public eye and behind the scenes. He offers a rare window on oval office political strategic machination as well as a fresh perspective on the McCarthy hearings. It is always a pleasure for a reader of history when the historian can provide an account of an event that goes beyond what is common knowledge, while maintaining fidelity to credible historic records. David Nichols succeeds very capably in this pursuit.