Potus Geeks Book Review: The Killing of Osama Bin Laden by Seymour Hersh
Although Seymour Hersh's new book is called The Killing of Osama Bin Ladin, that's only a small part of its subject matter. It's really a critical indictment of the Obama administration's middle east foreign policy, especially concerning Syria and Turkey. It's also about US relations with Vladimir Putin's Russia. In each of these areas Hersh writes about how US policy is either flawed because of lack of planning, blinding idealism, failure to recognize who the real enemy is, political motives instead of moral ones, and in some cases even outright lies.
Among the controversial assertions that Hersh makes in the book, he alleges that Osama bin Laden was never in hiding plotting future acts of terror, but rather was a sort of prisoner of the Pakistani government, and that his capture was done with co-operation from the Pakistanis, even thought the spin was that they were concealing the fact that they knew where Bin Laden was the whole time. He accuses the Obama administration of double-crossing the Pakistanis that they were working with by announcing the kill ahead of schedule, at a time when it was advantageous for Obama's re-election chances, but dangerous to the Pakistani generals who cooperated with the administration. He also asserts that bin Laden's body was never buried at sea, and that the PR campaign to win points off of the announcement was riddled with falsehoods.
Much of the book is a criticism of Obama's policy in Syria. He argues that Turkish president Recep Erdegon is the real villain of the piece and that Erdegon was complicit in chemical attacks on Syrians in an attempt to incite the US to depose Syrian leader Assad. He also claims that Erdegon is aiding Syrian rebels who are more of a threat to US interests than Assad. It's not that Hersh is pro-Assad. For him it's a matter of pragmatism.
Hersh's allegations might otherwise be completely lacking in credibility, were it not for his usual array of very credible sources, perhaps the most compelling of which is former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey, whose support Hersh attributes for most of the positions that he is espousing. Dempsey was recently replaced by a successor who the author claims is more in tune with his president's way of thinking. Other sources include a Hawaiian member of Congress (a former veteran and now a member of the House Armed Services committee) and a general who was mustered out for speaking against the party line.
Hersh concludes with an argument that the key to defeating terrorist groups is to work with the other major powers Russia and China, rather than retreating into a Cold War mentality.
Hersh's views will no doubt be seen as controversial and will attract criticism from those who incorrectly see him as some kind of apologist for Assad. His argument is one of pragmatism rather than support. But let's face it, the murky world of Middle East policy is filled with so much misinformation and deliberately obtuse messages that it is impossible for we mere mortals to properly assess the correctness of what Hersh is advocating. The point to be taken from all of this is that it is important to think about these subjects and to have a frank and honest dialogue, free from fear of being accused of being unpatriotic simply for asking the relevant questions and for questioning the government's message. The lessons of history have taught us as much. In this short (124 page) volume, Hersh succeeds in making the reader think about this very important subject. It is well worth the time it takes to read this book.
Among the controversial assertions that Hersh makes in the book, he alleges that Osama bin Laden was never in hiding plotting future acts of terror, but rather was a sort of prisoner of the Pakistani government, and that his capture was done with co-operation from the Pakistanis, even thought the spin was that they were concealing the fact that they knew where Bin Laden was the whole time. He accuses the Obama administration of double-crossing the Pakistanis that they were working with by announcing the kill ahead of schedule, at a time when it was advantageous for Obama's re-election chances, but dangerous to the Pakistani generals who cooperated with the administration. He also asserts that bin Laden's body was never buried at sea, and that the PR campaign to win points off of the announcement was riddled with falsehoods.
Much of the book is a criticism of Obama's policy in Syria. He argues that Turkish president Recep Erdegon is the real villain of the piece and that Erdegon was complicit in chemical attacks on Syrians in an attempt to incite the US to depose Syrian leader Assad. He also claims that Erdegon is aiding Syrian rebels who are more of a threat to US interests than Assad. It's not that Hersh is pro-Assad. For him it's a matter of pragmatism.
Hersh's allegations might otherwise be completely lacking in credibility, were it not for his usual array of very credible sources, perhaps the most compelling of which is former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey, whose support Hersh attributes for most of the positions that he is espousing. Dempsey was recently replaced by a successor who the author claims is more in tune with his president's way of thinking. Other sources include a Hawaiian member of Congress (a former veteran and now a member of the House Armed Services committee) and a general who was mustered out for speaking against the party line.
Hersh concludes with an argument that the key to defeating terrorist groups is to work with the other major powers Russia and China, rather than retreating into a Cold War mentality.
Hersh's views will no doubt be seen as controversial and will attract criticism from those who incorrectly see him as some kind of apologist for Assad. His argument is one of pragmatism rather than support. But let's face it, the murky world of Middle East policy is filled with so much misinformation and deliberately obtuse messages that it is impossible for we mere mortals to properly assess the correctness of what Hersh is advocating. The point to be taken from all of this is that it is important to think about these subjects and to have a frank and honest dialogue, free from fear of being accused of being unpatriotic simply for asking the relevant questions and for questioning the government's message. The lessons of history have taught us as much. In this short (124 page) volume, Hersh succeeds in making the reader think about this very important subject. It is well worth the time it takes to read this book.