The Anniversary of the Bay of Pigs
On April 17, 1961 (54 years ago today) just after midnight, two CIA oeratives, along with an Underwater Demolition Team of five frogmen, entered Bahia de Cochinos (known as the Bay of Pigs) on the southern coast of Cuba. They were followed by a force of four transport ships carrying about 1,400 Cuban exile ground troops and their assault vehicles.At about 01:00, the principal landing took place at Playa Girón (code-named Blue Beach), while other troops landed 35 km further northwest at Playa Larga (code-named Red Beach). Unloading troops at night was delayed, due to engine failures and boats damaged by unseen coral reefs. The few militia in the area succeeded in warning Cuban armed forces via radio soon after the first landing.
At daybreak at about 06:30, three Sea Fury aircraft and two T-33 jets started attacking those ships which were still unloading troops. At about 06:50, and 8 kilometres (5.0 mi) south of Playa Larga, one of the ships was severely damaged by rockets from a Sea Fury and a T-33. About 270 troops had been unloaded, but about 180 survivors who struggled ashore were incapable of taking part in further action because of the loss of most of their weapons and equipment. At about 07:00, two invading B-26 bombers attacked and sank the Cuban Navy Patrol Escort ship El Baire at Nueva Gerona on the Isle of Pines. They then proceeded to Girón to join two other B-26s to attack Cuban ground troops and provide distraction air cover for the paratroop C-46s and the CEF ships under air attack.
At about 07:30, CIA aircraft dropped 177 paratroops from the parachute battalion of Brigade 2506 in an action code-named Operation Falcon. About 30 men, plus heavy equipment, were dropped, but the equipment was lost in the swamps, and the troops failed to block the road.
By 09:00, Cuban troops and militia from outside the area had started arriving at the location of the parachute drop. Throughout the day they were reinforced by more troops, heavy armour and T-34 tanks typically carried on flat-bed trucks. At about 11:00, Premier Fidel Castro issued a statement over Cuba's nationwide network saying that the invaders, members of the exiled Cuban revolutionary front, have come to destroy the revolution and take away the dignity and rights of men.
By about 11:00, the two remaining freighters containing the invading force, and the CIA LCIs and LCUs, started retreating south to international waters, but still pursued by Cuban aircraft. By 12:00, hundreds of militia cadets from Matanzas had secured Palpite, and cautiously advanced on foot south towards Playa Larga. By dusk, other Cuban ground forces were gradually advancing southward, all without heavy weapons or armour.
Osvaldo Ramírez (leader of the rural resistance to Castro) was captured in Aromas de Velázquez, and immediately executed. At about 9:00 p.m. a night air strike by the invading force on San Antonio de Los Baños airfield failed, due to incompetence and bad weather. Two other B-26s had aborted the mission after take-off.
The failed invasion had been the brainchild of CIA officers in the Eisenhower administration who had created a plan to overthrow the Fidel Castro regime in Cuba. The plan was for an invasion of Cuba by a counter-revolutionary insurgency composed of U.S.-trained anti-Castro Cuban exiles led by CIA paramilitary officers. The intention was to invade Cuba and instigate an uprising among the Cuban people in hopes of removing Castro from power. The invasion plans were approved by President John F. Kennedy
No U.S. air support was provided was the invaders. Allen Dulles, director of the CIA, later stated that they thought the president would authorize any action required for success once the troops were on the ground. Dulles was mistaken. By April 19, 1961, the Cuban government had captured or killed the invading exiles, and Kennedy was forced to negotiate for the release of the 1,189 survivors. After twenty months, Cuba released the captured exiles in exchange for $53 million worth of food and medicine.
The incident made Castro wary of the U.S. and led him to believe another invasion would occur. According to biographer Richard Reeves, Kennedy primarily focused on the political repercussions of the plan rather than the military considerations. When the invasion failed, he was convinced the plan was a setup to make him look bad. But he took responsibility for the failure, saying, "... We got a big kick in the leg and we deserved it. But maybe we'll learn something from it."
In late 1961 the White House formed the "Special Group (Augmented)", headed by Robert Kennedy and including Edward Lansdale and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. The group's objective which was to overthrow Castro via espionage, sabotage, and other covert tactics, was never pursued.
Kennedy later told Hugh Sidey of Time Magazine:
"Someday, write a book about all this. I want to know how all this could have happened. There were 50 or so of us, presumably the most experienced and smartest people we could get, to plan such an operation. Most of us thought it would work. I know there are some men now saying they were opposed from the start. I wasn't aware of any great opposition. Even [Senator] Bill Fulbright [who later claimed to have heatedly protested the invasion plans] was not so outspoken as he claimed. After the last briefing which he attended, he took me aside and told me he could see there was a lot more to this plan than he had realized. But five minutes after it began to fall in, we all looked at each other and asked, 'How could we have been so stupid?' When we saw the wide range of the failures we asked ourselves why it had not been apparent to somebody from the start. I guess you get walled off from reality when you want something to succeed too much. Remember, Sidey, write that book and explain it to all of us."
At daybreak at about 06:30, three Sea Fury aircraft and two T-33 jets started attacking those ships which were still unloading troops. At about 06:50, and 8 kilometres (5.0 mi) south of Playa Larga, one of the ships was severely damaged by rockets from a Sea Fury and a T-33. About 270 troops had been unloaded, but about 180 survivors who struggled ashore were incapable of taking part in further action because of the loss of most of their weapons and equipment. At about 07:00, two invading B-26 bombers attacked and sank the Cuban Navy Patrol Escort ship El Baire at Nueva Gerona on the Isle of Pines. They then proceeded to Girón to join two other B-26s to attack Cuban ground troops and provide distraction air cover for the paratroop C-46s and the CEF ships under air attack.
At about 07:30, CIA aircraft dropped 177 paratroops from the parachute battalion of Brigade 2506 in an action code-named Operation Falcon. About 30 men, plus heavy equipment, were dropped, but the equipment was lost in the swamps, and the troops failed to block the road.
By 09:00, Cuban troops and militia from outside the area had started arriving at the location of the parachute drop. Throughout the day they were reinforced by more troops, heavy armour and T-34 tanks typically carried on flat-bed trucks. At about 11:00, Premier Fidel Castro issued a statement over Cuba's nationwide network saying that the invaders, members of the exiled Cuban revolutionary front, have come to destroy the revolution and take away the dignity and rights of men.
By about 11:00, the two remaining freighters containing the invading force, and the CIA LCIs and LCUs, started retreating south to international waters, but still pursued by Cuban aircraft. By 12:00, hundreds of militia cadets from Matanzas had secured Palpite, and cautiously advanced on foot south towards Playa Larga. By dusk, other Cuban ground forces were gradually advancing southward, all without heavy weapons or armour.
Osvaldo Ramírez (leader of the rural resistance to Castro) was captured in Aromas de Velázquez, and immediately executed. At about 9:00 p.m. a night air strike by the invading force on San Antonio de Los Baños airfield failed, due to incompetence and bad weather. Two other B-26s had aborted the mission after take-off.
The failed invasion had been the brainchild of CIA officers in the Eisenhower administration who had created a plan to overthrow the Fidel Castro regime in Cuba. The plan was for an invasion of Cuba by a counter-revolutionary insurgency composed of U.S.-trained anti-Castro Cuban exiles led by CIA paramilitary officers. The intention was to invade Cuba and instigate an uprising among the Cuban people in hopes of removing Castro from power. The invasion plans were approved by President John F. Kennedy
No U.S. air support was provided was the invaders. Allen Dulles, director of the CIA, later stated that they thought the president would authorize any action required for success once the troops were on the ground. Dulles was mistaken. By April 19, 1961, the Cuban government had captured or killed the invading exiles, and Kennedy was forced to negotiate for the release of the 1,189 survivors. After twenty months, Cuba released the captured exiles in exchange for $53 million worth of food and medicine.
The incident made Castro wary of the U.S. and led him to believe another invasion would occur. According to biographer Richard Reeves, Kennedy primarily focused on the political repercussions of the plan rather than the military considerations. When the invasion failed, he was convinced the plan was a setup to make him look bad. But he took responsibility for the failure, saying, "... We got a big kick in the leg and we deserved it. But maybe we'll learn something from it."
In late 1961 the White House formed the "Special Group (Augmented)", headed by Robert Kennedy and including Edward Lansdale and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. The group's objective which was to overthrow Castro via espionage, sabotage, and other covert tactics, was never pursued.
Kennedy later told Hugh Sidey of Time Magazine:
"Someday, write a book about all this. I want to know how all this could have happened. There were 50 or so of us, presumably the most experienced and smartest people we could get, to plan such an operation. Most of us thought it would work. I know there are some men now saying they were opposed from the start. I wasn't aware of any great opposition. Even [Senator] Bill Fulbright [who later claimed to have heatedly protested the invasion plans] was not so outspoken as he claimed. After the last briefing which he attended, he took me aside and told me he could see there was a lot more to this plan than he had realized. But five minutes after it began to fall in, we all looked at each other and asked, 'How could we have been so stupid?' When we saw the wide range of the failures we asked ourselves why it had not been apparent to somebody from the start. I guess you get walled off from reality when you want something to succeed too much. Remember, Sidey, write that book and explain it to all of us."