JFK's Final Days: November 3, 1963
Thurston Clarke, in his recent book JFK's Last Hundred Days: The Transformation of a Man and the Emergence of a Great President, doesn't tell us what John F. Kennedy was doing on Sunday, November 3, 1963 (50 years ago today). The day before he had learned of the deaths of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu in the coup led by General Duong Van Minh (known as "Big Minh") in South Vietnam. He had asked about the reports of how the coup was being received. Some of his aides had told him that there was "jubilance in the streets" but JFK wasn't buying it, saying "I'm not sure about that."
Kennedy discussed how the White House would respond to news reports about the coup. Clarke writes, at pages 280-1:
After more speculation about the popularity of the coup, [Kennedy] asked, "What are we gonna say about the, uh, death of Diem and Nhu? We're not gonna say anything, right?"
Someone remarked that reporters were being told that the government was receiving conflicting reports about their deaths.
"We've already got an unfortunate event," he said. "Nonetheless, it would be regrettable if it were ascribed, unless the evidence is clear, to Big Minh and the responsible council of generals. I don't want it wrapped around him if we can help it."
Hilsman speculated that more information about those responsible for the murders of Diem and Nhu would surface within the next forty-eight hours.
"I'm sure [Ambassador Henry Cabot] Lodge must be aware that this is an unfortunate matter," Kennedy said, "and I suppose that they're going to make every effort to disassociate Big Minh and Conein [the CIA officer who had been the principal intermediary with the generals plotting the coup]." Speaking of Minh, he added, "If there was not responsibility on his part, that should be made clear."
"In other words, get a story and stick to it," Hilsman said.
Stepping back from what might be construed as an attempt to cover up Big Minh's role in the assassinations, he said, "It ought to be a true story... if possible."
Kennedy discussed how the White House would respond to news reports about the coup. Clarke writes, at pages 280-1:
After more speculation about the popularity of the coup, [Kennedy] asked, "What are we gonna say about the, uh, death of Diem and Nhu? We're not gonna say anything, right?"
Someone remarked that reporters were being told that the government was receiving conflicting reports about their deaths.
"We've already got an unfortunate event," he said. "Nonetheless, it would be regrettable if it were ascribed, unless the evidence is clear, to Big Minh and the responsible council of generals. I don't want it wrapped around him if we can help it."
Hilsman speculated that more information about those responsible for the murders of Diem and Nhu would surface within the next forty-eight hours.
"I'm sure [Ambassador Henry Cabot] Lodge must be aware that this is an unfortunate matter," Kennedy said, "and I suppose that they're going to make every effort to disassociate Big Minh and Conein [the CIA officer who had been the principal intermediary with the generals plotting the coup]." Speaking of Minh, he added, "If there was not responsibility on his part, that should be made clear."
"In other words, get a story and stick to it," Hilsman said.
Stepping back from what might be construed as an attempt to cover up Big Minh's role in the assassinations, he said, "It ought to be a true story... if possible."