JFK's Final Days: October 29, 1963
Author Thurston Clarke, in his recent book JFK's Last Hundred Days: The Transformation of a Man and the Emergence of a Great President, notes that President John F. Kennedy was relieved on Tuesday morning October 29, 1963, that none of the newspapers were aware of any potential scandal involving him and Ellen Rometsch. Kennedy had a cabinet meeting that day, during which two of the most important issues of his presidency would be discussed: (1) civil rights and (2) Vietnam.
Clarke notes that during the cabinet meeting, Kennedy wrote the word "poverty" on a yellow legal pad, repeatedly underlining and circling it. He had learned that House leaders had agreed to support his compromise civil rights bill, though almost all of the support for the bill came from northern congressmen. One Representative, Richard Libonati from Chicago, was withholding support, so Kennedy called Chicago Mayor Richard Daley to ask the Mayor to "persuade" Libonati to support the bill. Daley is quoted as saying "He'll vote for it. He'll vote for any goddamn thing you want." Despite Daley's persuasion, Libonati voted against the bill in the judiciary committee.
Caroline and John Kennedy visited the oval office to show their father their Halloween costumes. Photographer Cecil Stoughton took this photograph:
At the cabinet meeting, William Colby who was then the CIA's far east division chief, reported on the potential coup in South Vietnam, with pro and con supporters of Premier Diem appearing to be about even. Robert Kennedy said "We're putting the whole future of the country, and really southeast Asia, in the hands of somebody we don't know very well." He was referring to General Don, chief of the plotters. President Kennedy said that a coup was too risky and he said that Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge should discourage it. A cable was sent to Lodge to this effect. On page 273, Clarke writes:
In his response, Lodge called out Kennedy for his timidity and ethics. After conceding that it was important to "get best possible estimate of coup's success," he contended that this was irrelevant since he did not think that "we have power to delay or discourage a coup." It would be, he cabled, "theoretically possible for us to turn over the information which has been given to us in confidence to Diem and this would undoubtedly stop the coup," but that "would make traitors of us." The bottom line, he argued, was that "we have very little influence on what is essentially a Vietnamese affair." Referring to Kennedy's demand that the plotters provide proof that they could succeed, he said "I do not know what more proof can be offered than the fact that these men are obviously prepared to risk their lives and that they want nothing for themselves. If I am any judge of human nature, Don's face expressed sincerity and determination on the morning that I spoke to him." He concluded, "If we were convinced coup was going to fail, we would, of course, do everything we could to stop it."
This was not good enough for Bundy and Kennedy. In a sharply worded reply, they said they could not accept "that we have no power to delay or discourage a coup." Reminding him of his statement that he would do everything to stop a coup that they believed doomed to fail, they said, "We believe that on this same basis you should take action to persuade coup leaders to stop or delay any operation which, in your best judgement, does not clearly give high prospect of success." Feeling it was necessary to defend their honor, they added, "We have never considered any betrayal of Generals to Diem."
Clarke notes that during the cabinet meeting, Kennedy wrote the word "poverty" on a yellow legal pad, repeatedly underlining and circling it. He had learned that House leaders had agreed to support his compromise civil rights bill, though almost all of the support for the bill came from northern congressmen. One Representative, Richard Libonati from Chicago, was withholding support, so Kennedy called Chicago Mayor Richard Daley to ask the Mayor to "persuade" Libonati to support the bill. Daley is quoted as saying "He'll vote for it. He'll vote for any goddamn thing you want." Despite Daley's persuasion, Libonati voted against the bill in the judiciary committee.
Caroline and John Kennedy visited the oval office to show their father their Halloween costumes. Photographer Cecil Stoughton took this photograph:
At the cabinet meeting, William Colby who was then the CIA's far east division chief, reported on the potential coup in South Vietnam, with pro and con supporters of Premier Diem appearing to be about even. Robert Kennedy said "We're putting the whole future of the country, and really southeast Asia, in the hands of somebody we don't know very well." He was referring to General Don, chief of the plotters. President Kennedy said that a coup was too risky and he said that Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge should discourage it. A cable was sent to Lodge to this effect. On page 273, Clarke writes:
In his response, Lodge called out Kennedy for his timidity and ethics. After conceding that it was important to "get best possible estimate of coup's success," he contended that this was irrelevant since he did not think that "we have power to delay or discourage a coup." It would be, he cabled, "theoretically possible for us to turn over the information which has been given to us in confidence to Diem and this would undoubtedly stop the coup," but that "would make traitors of us." The bottom line, he argued, was that "we have very little influence on what is essentially a Vietnamese affair." Referring to Kennedy's demand that the plotters provide proof that they could succeed, he said "I do not know what more proof can be offered than the fact that these men are obviously prepared to risk their lives and that they want nothing for themselves. If I am any judge of human nature, Don's face expressed sincerity and determination on the morning that I spoke to him." He concluded, "If we were convinced coup was going to fail, we would, of course, do everything we could to stop it."
This was not good enough for Bundy and Kennedy. In a sharply worded reply, they said they could not accept "that we have no power to delay or discourage a coup." Reminding him of his statement that he would do everything to stop a coup that they believed doomed to fail, they said, "We believe that on this same basis you should take action to persuade coup leaders to stop or delay any operation which, in your best judgement, does not clearly give high prospect of success." Feeling it was necessary to defend their honor, they added, "We have never considered any betrayal of Generals to Diem."