Nixon and Dean
In March of 1973, the spring following the June 1972 Watergate break-in, staff at the White House could feel the issue becoming very problematic for the administration. The White House burglars were about to be sentenced and Howard Hunt was demanding cash for silence. On March 19th, White House counsel told fellow lawyer Bud Krogh "Bud, I'm scared, really scared. I'm so scared I can't even make love to my wife."
The next day, Dean met with President Richard Nixon to discuss the seriousness of the situation, which he called "a cancer" on the presidency. A good account of Dean's meeting with Nixon can be found Jonathan Aitken's 1993 biography Nixon: A Life at pages 487-9. Aitken, then a British Member of Parliament and Cabinet member, describes the meeting and its aftermath, occurring as it did forty years ago this week, as follows:
After this apocalyptic opening, Dean began reciting his version of the Watergate story. Most of his account was familiar territory, but he made some smartingly new disclosures. "The most troublesome post thing," said Dean, referring to the cover-up following the break-in, "is that Bob [Haldeman] is involved in that; John [Ehrlichman] is involved in that; I am involved in that; Mitchell is involved in that. And that is an obstruction of justice." Nixon reeled in astonishment at the suggestion that his senior aides might be involved in a criminal conspiracy. "How was Bob involved" he asked, believing that Dean must be over-dramatizing. Dean explained that Haldeman had let him use a $350,000 cash fund in his safe to make payments to the defendants. He said that he, Haldeman and Ehrlichman had decided that "there was no price too high to pay to let this thing blow up in front of the election."
Dean then came to his primary concern, which was how to handle the burglars' demands for money. Hunt wanted "by the close of business yesterday" a payment of $122,000 in cash. Otherwise he would tell all about the Ellsberg break-in and other "seamy things" that he had done for the White House. With Judge Sirica's exemplary sentences expected in two days' time, this was an alarming threat. Dean added, "this is going to be a continual blackmail operation by Hunt and Liddy and the Cubans." "How much money do you need?" the President asked a few moments later. "I would say these people are going to cost a million dollars over the next two years," replied Dean. "We could get that," said the President. "If you need the money, I mean, uh, you could get the money... You could get a million dollars and you could get it in cash. I know where it could be gotten. I mean, it's not easy, but it could be done."
This exchange, at first reading, seems devastating to Nixon, for it appears to confirm his willingness to pay a million dollars in hush money to the burglars. However, later on in the conversation, there is some evidence that he was speaking hypothetically, making the remark a few seconds afterwards, "I'm just thinking out loud here, for a moment."
The interpretation that the president was merely flying a hypothetical kite in this dialogue is further supported by the fact that he took no further action to find such mega-funding or to pay continuous hush money to the defendants. On the other hand, later in the conversation Nixon seemed to get rattled by the urgency of the threat from Hunt. The "immediate thing," he declared, "is you've got no choice with Hunt but the hundred and twenty or whatever it is, right?" Dean agreed. "You'd better damn well get that done, but fast", ordered the President. Done it was.
Nixon was by now lurching into deep and possibly criminal involvement in the cover-up. He was willing to pay Danegold to Hunt to stave off a crisis, but not to any more Danes in future. This was equivalent to becoming a little bit pregnant and then stopping. Perhaps a more generous interpretation is that Nixon temporarily yielded to the temptation to pay Hunt's eve of sentencing blackmail demand for reasons of expediency, but thereafter decided as a matter or principle that it would be wrong to get into any blackmail payments. He took a rather firmer line on the next problem Dean raised, which was Hunt's expectation of clemency. Dean said the other defendants would also be expecting a commutation of sentence, and added, "I'm not sure that you will ever be able to deliver on the clemency. It may just be too hot." "You can't do it until after the '74 elections, that's for sure," responded Nixon. "But even then, your point is that even then you couldn't do it." "That's right" said Dean. "It may further involve you in a way you shouldn't be involved in this." "No, it's wrong, that's for sure" was the President's last word on clemency.
The helplessness of his position was dawning on Nixon. After some wobbling, he decided to go no further in paying blackmail. He had rejected clemency. These decisions had meant that sooner or later the storm would burst. The only way to pre-empt it was for the President to make his own full disclosure statement. Yet after one or two feints in the direction during the dialogue with Dean and in subsequent conversations over the next two days with Dean, Haldeman and Ehrlichman, Nixon faltered and decided that honesty was not yet the best policy. "There was just something in the make-up of the man that made it impossible for him to bare his breast to the nation," was Ehrlichman's interpretation of the President's refusal to accept the hangout route.
The 21-22 March meetings ended in an amoral stalemate. The only conclusion was that Dean should go to Camp David and write a report. "See what you can come up with," said Nixon optimistically. The prospective revisionist historian immediately expressed his discomfort. "I was everywhere - everywhere they look, they are going to find Dean," he muttered as he prepared to depart for the Catocins.
Dean's sojourn at Camp David from 23-28 March was a major turning point in the Watergate story. While he composed his thoughts on the mountain top, events were moving fast in Washington. On the morning of 23 March, Judge John Sirica announced his provisional sentences on the Watergate burglars. He gave thirty-five years to Hunt, forty years apiece to the Cubans, and twenty years to Liddy. However, James McCord was freed on bond because he sent a letter to the judge offering cooperation for leniency. Those sentences went far beyond Sirica living up to his nickname "Maximum John." For unarmed first offenders who had not stolen anything, the prison terms were sheer judicial terrorism. Sirica was quite blatant about his motives, saying that the sentencing was harsh in order to make the defendants talk.
The next day, Dean met with President Richard Nixon to discuss the seriousness of the situation, which he called "a cancer" on the presidency. A good account of Dean's meeting with Nixon can be found Jonathan Aitken's 1993 biography Nixon: A Life at pages 487-9. Aitken, then a British Member of Parliament and Cabinet member, describes the meeting and its aftermath, occurring as it did forty years ago this week, as follows:
After this apocalyptic opening, Dean began reciting his version of the Watergate story. Most of his account was familiar territory, but he made some smartingly new disclosures. "The most troublesome post thing," said Dean, referring to the cover-up following the break-in, "is that Bob [Haldeman] is involved in that; John [Ehrlichman] is involved in that; I am involved in that; Mitchell is involved in that. And that is an obstruction of justice." Nixon reeled in astonishment at the suggestion that his senior aides might be involved in a criminal conspiracy. "How was Bob involved" he asked, believing that Dean must be over-dramatizing. Dean explained that Haldeman had let him use a $350,000 cash fund in his safe to make payments to the defendants. He said that he, Haldeman and Ehrlichman had decided that "there was no price too high to pay to let this thing blow up in front of the election."
Dean then came to his primary concern, which was how to handle the burglars' demands for money. Hunt wanted "by the close of business yesterday" a payment of $122,000 in cash. Otherwise he would tell all about the Ellsberg break-in and other "seamy things" that he had done for the White House. With Judge Sirica's exemplary sentences expected in two days' time, this was an alarming threat. Dean added, "this is going to be a continual blackmail operation by Hunt and Liddy and the Cubans." "How much money do you need?" the President asked a few moments later. "I would say these people are going to cost a million dollars over the next two years," replied Dean. "We could get that," said the President. "If you need the money, I mean, uh, you could get the money... You could get a million dollars and you could get it in cash. I know where it could be gotten. I mean, it's not easy, but it could be done."
This exchange, at first reading, seems devastating to Nixon, for it appears to confirm his willingness to pay a million dollars in hush money to the burglars. However, later on in the conversation, there is some evidence that he was speaking hypothetically, making the remark a few seconds afterwards, "I'm just thinking out loud here, for a moment."
The interpretation that the president was merely flying a hypothetical kite in this dialogue is further supported by the fact that he took no further action to find such mega-funding or to pay continuous hush money to the defendants. On the other hand, later in the conversation Nixon seemed to get rattled by the urgency of the threat from Hunt. The "immediate thing," he declared, "is you've got no choice with Hunt but the hundred and twenty or whatever it is, right?" Dean agreed. "You'd better damn well get that done, but fast", ordered the President. Done it was.
Nixon was by now lurching into deep and possibly criminal involvement in the cover-up. He was willing to pay Danegold to Hunt to stave off a crisis, but not to any more Danes in future. This was equivalent to becoming a little bit pregnant and then stopping. Perhaps a more generous interpretation is that Nixon temporarily yielded to the temptation to pay Hunt's eve of sentencing blackmail demand for reasons of expediency, but thereafter decided as a matter or principle that it would be wrong to get into any blackmail payments. He took a rather firmer line on the next problem Dean raised, which was Hunt's expectation of clemency. Dean said the other defendants would also be expecting a commutation of sentence, and added, "I'm not sure that you will ever be able to deliver on the clemency. It may just be too hot." "You can't do it until after the '74 elections, that's for sure," responded Nixon. "But even then, your point is that even then you couldn't do it." "That's right" said Dean. "It may further involve you in a way you shouldn't be involved in this." "No, it's wrong, that's for sure" was the President's last word on clemency.
The helplessness of his position was dawning on Nixon. After some wobbling, he decided to go no further in paying blackmail. He had rejected clemency. These decisions had meant that sooner or later the storm would burst. The only way to pre-empt it was for the President to make his own full disclosure statement. Yet after one or two feints in the direction during the dialogue with Dean and in subsequent conversations over the next two days with Dean, Haldeman and Ehrlichman, Nixon faltered and decided that honesty was not yet the best policy. "There was just something in the make-up of the man that made it impossible for him to bare his breast to the nation," was Ehrlichman's interpretation of the President's refusal to accept the hangout route.
The 21-22 March meetings ended in an amoral stalemate. The only conclusion was that Dean should go to Camp David and write a report. "See what you can come up with," said Nixon optimistically. The prospective revisionist historian immediately expressed his discomfort. "I was everywhere - everywhere they look, they are going to find Dean," he muttered as he prepared to depart for the Catocins.
Dean's sojourn at Camp David from 23-28 March was a major turning point in the Watergate story. While he composed his thoughts on the mountain top, events were moving fast in Washington. On the morning of 23 March, Judge John Sirica announced his provisional sentences on the Watergate burglars. He gave thirty-five years to Hunt, forty years apiece to the Cubans, and twenty years to Liddy. However, James McCord was freed on bond because he sent a letter to the judge offering cooperation for leniency. Those sentences went far beyond Sirica living up to his nickname "Maximum John." For unarmed first offenders who had not stolen anything, the prison terms were sheer judicial terrorism. Sirica was quite blatant about his motives, saying that the sentencing was harsh in order to make the defendants talk.